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Wyman and Williams: Migrating Boundaries

MIGRATING BOUNDARIES
Katrina M. Wyman* & Nicholas R. Williams†
Abstract
The boundaries between land parcels usually are assumed to be static
and unchanging. However, not all land borders are stable. An important
land boundary that routinely ambulates is the border between what is
publicly and privately owned along U.S. coastal shores. This coastal
boundary recently has been the subject of renewed attention from the
courts, scholars, and even the popular press in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy. This Article offers an economic analysis of why the boundary
generally ambulates, rather than remaining perpetually fixed as land
borders usually are assumed to do. It also considers whether the legal
border generally should continue to migrate in an era of sea level rise
due to climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
We usually conceive of land borders as static and unchanging, and
sometimes literally fixed in stone.1 Indeed, stability might seem to be a
* Sarah Herring Sorin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This
Article benefited from comments and suggestions from Gregory Alexander, Peter Byrne, Donna
Christie, Josh Eagle, Richard Epstein, Joseph Sax, Henry Smith, and the staff of the FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW; and from presentations at the 2013 conference of the Canadian Law and
Economics Association, and the Institute for Policy Integrity. Professor Wyman gratefully
acknowledges the support of the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at
NYU School of Law.
† J.D. 2013, New York University School of Law.
1. Think of Robert Frost’s famous poem Mending Wall, in which the two neighbors
preserve the boundary between them by meeting each year to fix the fence of stones that
separates them. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33–34
1957
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prerequisite for borders given that they are intended “to provide
certainty and permanence.”2 The idea that land borders are fixed also is
embedded in contemporary theoretical work on property. A prominent
example is Professor Henry Smith’s characterization of land boundaries
as “rough” “on/off” “signals” that tell us to keep off others’ property. 3
If land boundaries routinely fluctuated, it would be hard for them to act
as clear signals.4
Not all land borders, however, are stable and well suited to serve as
on/off signals. One dramatically unstable land border is the boundary
between what is privately and publicly owned along U.S. ocean shores.5
This boundary is usually defined as the “ordinary high water mark,”6
which in many coastal states is further specified as the “mean highwater line.”7 Areas landward of the mean high water line are often
private property, while state governments often own the lands seaward
of the mean high water line subject to the public trust doctrine.8 Many
Americans have the right to walk on coastal shores because state
(Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969).
2. Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
19, 26 n.41 (2009).
3. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1753 (2004)
[hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules]; see also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law
of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1713–14 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Property as the Law of
Things]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1890 (2007) (“Exclusion by its nature protects a wide variety of uses, and the signal
for violation is a simple on/off signal easily perceived by all—a boundary crossing in the case of
land.”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 280
n.17 (2008) (“[T]he on/off function of boundaries is fundamental to Smith’s understanding of
the standard case of property.”).
4. Though Smith’s work does not explicitly discuss the idea that land borders are stable,
the idea is implicit in his work. See, e.g., Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 3, at
1713–14; Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1765.
Recent work by economists further bolsters the case for stable land borders, suggesting that
they promote investment and facilitate the exchange of land rights. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean
Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 257, 257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
5. See, e.g., JOSH EAGLE, COASTAL LAW 89 (2011); Lora A. Lucero, A Line in the Sand,
PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Jan. 2010, at 12.
6. BRUCE S. FLUSHMAN, WATER BOUNDARIES: DEMYSTIFYING LAND BOUNDARIES
ADJACENT TO TIDAL OR NAVIGABLE WATERS 73 (2002).
7. Id. at 119–21.
8. See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410–11 (1842);
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). The
public
trust
often
encompasses the wet beach underwater during high tide (also called the foreshore), and
submerged lands underlying tidal and navigable waters. There are useful diagrams of the areas
along the beach in EAGLE, supra note 5, at 90 (referring to “Wet sand or Foreshore”), and James
G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and
Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1291 fig.2 (1998). For a
discussion of the scope of the public trust, see, for example, id. at 1291, 1292–94, 1365–68.
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governments own the wet beach under the public trust.9
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in the boundary
between private and public trust property along the coasts. The coastal
boundary was a central issue in a widely discussed 2010 decision from
the U.S. Supreme Court,10 and several scholars recently turned their
attention to doctrines related to the boundary.11 In the wake of
Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged coastal shorelines in New Jersey, New
York, and Connecticut in October 2012, the legal rules determining the
coastal boundary have been discussed beyond the courts and academia
and in the popular press.12
This Article analyzes why the legal boundary between private and
public trust property along the ocean coastline generally ambulates,
rather than remaining fixed at a defined point as land borders usually
are assumed to do. We might be tempted to attribute the generally
ambulatory character of the boundary to natural forces.13 The
geographic location of the mean high water line shifts because of
physical changes altering the shore, such as the addition or the loss of
sand on the beach.14 But nature does not explain, by itself, why the legal
boundary should also move, and legal decision makers can opt not to
allow the boundary to follow the changes along the beach.15 The
common law offers a choice between freezing the boundary at the old
mean high water line by deploying the doctrine of avulsion, and shifting
the boundary in accordance with the changes wrought by nature by
using the doctrines of accretion and erosion (referred to collectively as
9. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (1986); Robert Thompson, Beach Access,
Trespass, and the Social Enactment of Property, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 351, 352
(2012).
10. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).
11. See generally J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property
Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012); Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the
Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 465 (2009); Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion
Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Andrew W. Karhl, The People’s Beach, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2012, at A31,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/opinion/beaches-belong-to-the-public.html.
13. See City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 549–51 (N.J. 2010); Severance
v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 718 (Tex. 2012); Christie, supra note 2, at 26.
14. EAGLE, supra note 5, at 308.
15. In Florida, for example, a state statute provides that before state-funded beach
renourishment projects, the state fixes the legal boundary in relation to the “pre-existing mean
high-water line.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599. This fixed line “replaces
the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property
and state property.” Id. Note, though, that there may be legal obstacles to fixing the boundary.
See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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“accretion,” unless otherwise noted).16 It is because of the
“contemporary strong presumption in favor of accretion” in the law that
the legal boundary between private and public trust property generally
shifts to follow the current mean high water line.17
This Article offers an economic rationale for the generally
ambulatory legal boundary between private and public trust property
along coastal shores. It argues that the tendency to shift the legal
boundary between private and public trust property to accord with
physical changes on the beach is likely efficient. The current
presumption in favor of a migratory boundary is a reasonably clear rule
that puts private and public landowners on notice that the boundaries of
their coastal holdings are subject to change along with physical
alterations of the shore and encourages landowners to plan accordingly.
Routinely fixing boundaries at a historic point also would be a
reasonably clear rule, but a presumption in favor of fixed boundaries
would lack two advantages of a migratory boundary. First, and most
importantly, a migratory boundary maximizes the value of both private
and public trust property along the shore by preserving the water
adjacency of both types of property.18 Second, an ambulatory boundary
has administrative advantages for the courts and private and public
landowners because it avoids the need to recreate a historic boundary.19
16. In using the term “accretion” broadly to refer to accretion as well as erosion, we
follow Sax, supra note 11, at 306 n.2; see also Byrne, supra note 11, at 80 & n.49. Professor
Sax’s use of “accretion” to refer to accretion as well as erosion may be a bit unconventional. For
narrower uses of accretion to refer to the gradual addition of land to the shore, but not erosion,
see, for example, EAGLE, supra note 5, at 308; FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 92; Merrill, supra
note 11, at 465.
17. Sax, supra note 11, at 346; see also infra note 66 (citing other sources referring to the
presumption in favor of accretion).
18. As mentioned below, commentators seem to agree that the principal rationale given by
the courts for an ambulatory boundary is the preservation of the water adjacency of private
landowners. The benefit of preserving public access to the wet beach and tidal and navigable
waters seems less well recognized. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
19. A brief word is in order about other scholarship that refers to the efficiency of
accretion. In a recent article critiquing the Supreme Court’s decision in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Professor Richard Epstein suggests that there is an economic logic to the
Roman law doctrine of alluvion due to its “low administrative costs” and preservation of
“[a]ccess to the ocean.” Epstein, supra note 11, at 52. Accretion narrowly construed as the
addition of land is the modern descendant of the doctrine of alluvion. Alluvion is better
understood today to refer to “the material deposited” through the physical addition of land to the
shore. Sax, supra note 11, at 306 n.2. We are grateful to Epstein for drawing our attention to his
recent article. Our argument that a migratory boundary is generally efficient is based largely on
English and American sources rather than the Roman law sources that Epstein discusses.
In addition, Professor Thomas Merrill recently offered an efficiency rationale for accretion
(narrowly construed), which he views as an example of the principle of accession. Merrill, supra
note 11, at 465–66. See infra note 79 for our critical analysis of Merrill’s treatment of accretion
as an instance of accession.
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After underscoring the “efficiency properties”20 of the current
preference for shifting the boundary, this Article examines whether the
legal boundary generally should continue to migrate with changes due
to natural forces in an era of climate change. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Sandy, many observers have underscored the need to prepare
coastal regions to adapt to climate change.21 The question of whether
the boundary should continue to migrate arises because sea level rise
due to climate change is expected to gradually shift the mean high water
line landward. If the common law doctrine of erosion is allowed to play
out as usual, public trust property will expand at the expense of private
property, as the mean high water line moves landward.22 Under existing
law, the private landowners who lose property rights due to sea level
rise are not entitled to compensation.23 The “unidirectional”24 nature of
the expected changes has prompted at least one commentator to raise a
question about the justice of applying the existing rule going forward
and to mention the option of compensating private property owners who
lose land to the public trust due to sea level rise.25 This Article argues
against revising the preference for a migratory boundary because such a
preference will likely prove efficient in the future as well.
The coastal boundary is important in practice due to the public’s
interests in the coast and the value of private coastal property.26 The
coastal boundary is of theoretical interest because of the centrality of
borders in exclusion-based understandings of property, such as
20. The phrase “efficiency properties” is borrowed from Merrill, who uses it in analyzing
the principle of accession. Merrill, supra note 11, at 501.
21. Matthew L. Wald & Danny Hakim, Storm Panel Recommends Major Changes in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/nyreg
ion/new-york-state-storm-panel-recommends-major-changes.html.
22. See infra note 135.
23. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
24. Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public
Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 88 (2011) (“Sea
level rise is a unidirectional change that will result in the continuous encroachment of the sea on
to littoral property.”); Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels,
Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 641, 645 (2010) (noting that the
“migratory boundary” is “unidirectional . . . with modern sea level rise”).
25. J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory
Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 633, 639 (2010);
Byrne, supra note 11, at 80, 96. Other sources more obliquely raise the prospect of changing the
rules of the game due to sea level rise. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW:
A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 674 (2d. ed. 2009) (asking whether “the
public/private boundary [should] migrate in accordance with changes in sea level”); Sax, supra
note 11, at 355–56; Michael A. Hiatt, Note, Come Hell or High Water: Reexamining the
Takings Clause in A Climate Changed Future, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 371, 383 (2008)
(“Large-scale sea level rise due to climate change should be considered beyond the scope of the
common law doctrine of erosion and accretion.”).
26. See, e.g., Christie, supra note 2, at 21–24, 29.
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Professor Smith’s, that currently dominate scholarly thinking about
property.27 Nevertheless, scholars have paid relatively little attention to
the legal rules that govern boundary determination along the ocean
shores—or inland.28
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the
legal rules that govern the boundary between private and public trust
property on U.S. shores. Part II demonstrates that a concern with
efficiency undergirds the existing preference for a migratory boundary.
It begins by arguing that five rationales offered in case law and by
commentators for an ambulatory boundary can be understood as
reflecting a concern with efficiency. We then offer our own explanation
for why an ambulatory boundary likely is efficient, drawing on themes
that emerge from the existing rationales. Part III emphasizes the
desirability of preserving the preference for an ambulatory boundary in
an era of sea level rise. We briefly conclude.
I. BACKGROUND
As the immense damage inflicted in the Northeast by Hurricane
Sandy recently underscored, many Americans live on land near the
oceans.29 Immediately adjoining the private—and sometimes public30—
lands on which Americans live along the shore are vast areas often
owned by the states that are covered by the public trust doctrine. This
Article is about the boundary between the lands that lie upward of the
dividing line, which we call private property (although some may be
27. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1409, 1413 (2012) (indicating that “several leading property scholars are again considering the
right to exclude as the most defining feature of property”); Henry E. Smith, Commentary to
Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, in
PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 356, 357 n.3 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2013) (referring to “exclusion theorists”).
28. Libecap & Lueck, supra note 4, at 258 (“While the demarcation of land is
fundamental to a system of property law it is largely unexplored by property law scholars and
instead simply, or implicitly, taken for granted.”). The way that people communicate their
claims to property is a related issue that has received attention from property scholars. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universal Recognizable Signals of Property
Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1022–32 (2011)
(discussing Professor Carol Rose’s great interest in the communication of property claims and
his own thoughts on the matter).
29. The press coverage of rebuilding in communities affected by Hurricane Sandy points
to the human presence along the coasts. David M. Halbfinger et al., On Ravaged Coastline, It’s
Rebuild Deliberately vs. Rebuild Now, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/22/nyregion/on-ravaged-coastline-its-rebuild-deliberately-vsrebuild-now.html.
30. Jonathan Mahler, How the Coastline Became a Place to Put the Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2012, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/nyregion/how-newyork-citys-coastline-became-home-to-the-poor.html.
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publicly owned), and the lands seaward of the dividing line, which we
refer to as public trust property. Public trust property is often state
owned, but can be privately owned “subject to the public trust.”31
Rooted in Roman and English law, the public trust doctrine dictates
that coastal states hold the lands underlying tidal and navigable waters
in trust for the public.32 There is a strong economic rationale for keeping
these lands under state ownership and open to the public, well explored
by scholars such as Professor Carol Rose and Professor Richard
Epstein.33 As a general matter, these lands are distinct from uplands and
suitable for different purposes. As the Florida Supreme Court once
explained:
The beaches of Florida are of such a character as to use
and potential development as to require separate
consideration from other lands with respect to the elements
and consequences of title. The sandy portion of the beaches
are of no use for farming, grazing, timber production, or
residency—the traditional uses of land—but has served as a
thoroughfare and haven for fishermen and bathers, as well
as a place of recreation for the public.34
Public ownership likely is the highest and best use of public trust
lands because it facilitates public use of these lands for the purposes for
which they are suited, namely the triad of navigation, commerce, and
fisheries traditionally protected by the public trust doctrine, and other
purposes more recently protected by the public trust, such as
recreation.35 Rose argues that public use of the trust lands has “scale
31. 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79A.01[6] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 1999).
32. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (noting the
public trust doctrine’s origins).
33. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987);
Rose, supra note 9; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 224–29 (2006).
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction &
Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 62–64 (2006); see Titus, supra note 8, at 1364; see
also Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 929 (2004) (“A
resource such as submerged land under navigable waters requires a kind of blend of open access
and exclusion rights.” (citing Epstein, supra, at 417)).
34. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974); see also
FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 75–76; Christie, supra note 2, at 21 (quoting Daytona Beach, 294
So. 2d at 77). Notably, beaches are generally located only partly on public trust lands. The
public trust encompasses the wet beach, but does not usually provide public access to the dry
beach. For exceptions, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 802–03 (2009) and Titus, supra note 8, at 1293, 1366–
68.
35. On the evolution of the public trust doctrine, see, for example, Cinque Bambini P’ship
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returns”: commerce generates ever-increasing wealth, for example,
while unrestricted public recreation (as well as commerce) may be
“socializing practice[s]” whose benefits are enhanced by the
participation of larger numbers of people.36 Epstein focuses on the risk
that private control of property covered by the public trust would result
in holdout behavior—a particularly acute risk along navigable
waterways.37 The public trust doctrine acts as a check on government
alienation of trust lands and waters, and preserves public access to
them.38 In Judge Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s terms,39
the public has an entitlement to the lands seaward of the mean high
water line that is protected by the public trust doctrine’s restrictions on
alienability.40
The boundary between private and public trust property is usually
defined as the ordinary high water mark.41 Since the early twentieth
v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust
Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 699,
707–14 (2006); and Rose, supra note 9, at 713–14, 727–30.
There also may be valuable resources in submerged lands, such as oil. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988); Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 511, aff’d, Phillips
Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. 469; Robert E. Beck, The Wandering Missouri: A Study in Accretion
Law, 43 N.D. L. REV. 429, 437 (1967).
36. Rose, supra note 9, at 777; see generally id. at 766–70, 775–81. In noneconomic
terms, we might say that holding certain types of property and use of that property open for the
public is fundamentally important to the well-being of society. See Robin Kundis Craig,
Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines,
34 VT. L. REV. 781, 798 (2010).
37. Epstein, supra note 33, at 415; see also PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215,
1230 (2012); Rose, supra note 9, at 750, 753–60.
Rose observes that “even if the holdout danger was necessary for a presumption of
‘publicness,’ that danger cannot have been sufficient. Surely, there should also be some reason
to suppose that a property will be more valuable if open to public access than it would be under
exclusive control.” Rose, supra note 9, at 761. She maintains “that the ‘scale returns’ of
socialization, taken together with the possibility of private holdout, will underlie any arguments
for the inherent publicness of property.” Id. at 781.
38. See generally Klass, supra note 35, at 699 (“To some, the doctrine is a vehicle for
public access to water, beaches, or fishing in a world otherwise dominated by private ownership.
To others it is a check on government attempts to give away or sell such resources for shortterm economic gain.”); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478–85, 556–65 (1970) (analyzing ideas
underpinning the public trust and the public trust doctrine).
39. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93, 1111–15 (1972)
(distinguishing inalienability rules from both property rules and liability rules, and discussing
inalienability rules in detail).
40. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 33, at 802 (“Illinois Central . . . . was the first
prominent decision squarely to hold that lands submerged under navigable waters are subject to
a rule of inalienability.” (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39)).
41. EAGLE, supra note 5, at 89 (“Most states set the legal coastline at the high-water
mark.”); FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 73; David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/7

8

Wyman and Williams: Migrating Boundaries

2013]

MIGRATING BOUNDARIES

1965

century, the ordinary high water mark has been more precisely defined
in many states as the “mean high-water line,”42 consistent with a 1935
Supreme Court decision defining the boundary as the “mean high-tide
line” when federal patents are involved.43 In some states the boundary
Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1376 n.6 (1996); David
C. Slade et al., Lands, Waters and Living Resources Subject to the Public Trust Doctrine, in
PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 13, 44 n.58 (1990) (listing cases defining the
landward boundary of the public trust in each coastal state); Titus, supra note 8, at 1365–66.
This Article is concerned with the boundary between private and public trust property along
the ocean coasts. The boundary between private and public trust property also may be defined as
the “ordinary high water mark” for other bodies of water. Bruce S. Flushman states that “[t]he
property boundary of lands adjacent to navigable lakes, the beds of which are owned by the
states, is, in most cases, the ordinary high water mark.” FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 295
(footnote omitted). In Glass v. Goeckel, the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the boundary for the application of the public trust doctrine on the Great Lakes is the “ordinary
high water mark” and that this is defined (following Wisconsin precedent) as “‘the point on the
bank or shore up to which the presence and action of water is so continuous as to leave a distinct
mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized
characteristic.’” 703 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Mich. 2005) (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145
N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)). The dissenting opinions in the case, which would have defined the
boundary as the “water’s edge,” emphasized that the ordinary high water mark is a hard
boundary to apply to nontidal waters like the Great Lakes, a point the majority partly
acknowledged. Id. at 79 (Young, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 83, 85, 93,
96–102 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 71. In State ex rel.
Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to define
the boundary for the public trust along Lake Erie as “the ordinary high-water mark,” and
insisted that the boundary is the “‘natural shoreline,’ which is the line at which the water usually
stands when free from disturbing causes.” 955 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio 2011); see also id. at 947
(refusing to define the boundary as the ordinary high-water mark based on precedent). We thank
Professor Joseph Sax for emphasizing the relevance of Glass and Merrill.
42. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 121; see also EAGLE, supra note 5, at 182; Christie, supra
note 2, at 32; Slade et al., supra note 41, at 44 n.58; Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 24, at 57. On
the timing of the move toward greater precision in defining the boundary between private and
public trust property, see FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 104–10, 119–21.
43. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1935). State law defines the
boundary between public trust and private property, except “with respect to uplands claimed
under federal patent,” when federal law applies. EAGLE, supra note 5, at 98.
The move to more precisely define the ordinary high water mark is likely related to the
growth in the value of coastal property and the “heightened awareness of the value of the
public’s shore lands” which probably increased the benefits of greater precision in coastal
boundary determinations. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 105–06; Frank E. Maloney & Richard C.
Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary
Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 245–46 (1974); see also In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 91 (Haw.
1968) (Marumoto, J., dissenting) (excerpting testimony indicating that it only “bec[a]me
important” to determine “the precise location” of the seaward boundary after “the value of
oceanside properties went up”).
The costs of defining a more precise boundary also may have declined over time. Originally
to assist with navigation, the federal government began to collect tidal observations in the 1850s
and developed “maps” of coastlines. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 118; see also In re Ashford,
440 P.2d at 82 (Marumoto, J., dissenting). The availability of this information facilitated more
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between private and public trust property is more favorable to private
landowners, extending to the low water mark.44 There are also a few
states where the boundary between private and public trust property is
not defined by reference to data about the tides, but rather is defined as
the “vegetation line.”45 From the public’s perspective, the vegetation
line is an expansive boundary because it lies upland of the mean high
water line (and necessarily the low water mark), and state ownership up
to the vegetation line means the state owns the dry as well as the wet
beach.46 The vegetation line is more easily discerned when walking on
the beach than the mean high water line,47 but the vegetation line is not
as precise.48
The mean high water line is a precise boundary determined by a
survey and tidal data, but the boundary shifts regularly due to changes
in the landform along the shore.49 There are “vertical” and “horizontal”
accurate boundary determination using tidal data. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 115–16, 118–19;
Charles E. Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and to What Extent Is This a Federal
Question?, 42 WASH. L. REV. 33, 63, 65 (1966).
44. Eagle indicates that “[s]even states—Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin—extend the area capable of ordinary private
ownership to the low-water mark.” EAGLE, supra note 5, at 89. James G. Titus indicates that the
boundary is the low water mark in five states (Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Virginia). Titus, supra note 8, at 1293 n.41. However, Titus emphasizes that:
Ownership . . . is only part of the picture. In the five states where the
tidelands are privately owned, the public still has an easement along the
tidelands for at least some purposes—for example, hunting, fishing, and
navigation. In several states, the public has access along the dry beach for
recreational use as well.
Titus, supra note 8, at 1293.
45. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 107; Titus, supra note 8, at 1366 n.360. States that use the
vegetation line may consider it a specification of the “high-water mark” or “high-water line,”
and the vegetation line may serve as a proxy for the upper reach of the tides. Dolphin Lane
Assocs. Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 333 N.E.2d 358, 359–60 (N.Y. 1975).
In defining the boundary for the public trust along the Great Lakes as the ordinary high
water mark, the Supreme Court of Michigan suggested that a mark left by the “‘destruction of
terrestrial vegetation’” might signal the ordinary high water mark. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62
(quoting State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Wis. 1987)). Concurring in part and dissenting
in part, Justice Young asked, “[I]n what sense would the line of vegetation be an ordinary high
water mark in the sense suggested by the majority’s definition?” Id. at 81 (Young, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
46. Titus, supra note 8, at 1290–92, 1366 n.360.
47. Christie, supra note 2, at 31.
48. See Ashford, 440 P.2d at 80 (Marumoto, J., dissenting).
49. See In re 1 AARON L. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 89–90 (1962); Joseph
J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and Beaches: The Rights of
Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1427, 1444 (2005) (noting that
“natural forces [may] change the contours of the beach itself” and therefore shift the “mean high
tide line”).
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components of the boundary.50 The vertical component is based “on the
height reached by the tide during its vertical rise and fall” over a
roughly nineteen-year period.51 The “mean high water” level is “[t]he
average height of all the high-waters at a location for a period of 19
years.”52 Tidal observations from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s National Ocean Service or predecessor
agencies may be used to calculate the vertical component, perhaps
supplemented by tidal observations from other sources.53 While the
vertical component of the boundary
is basically stable, being based on observations over
nineteen years[, t]he horizontal element of the boundary
determination on a sandy beach is anything but stable. The
intersection of the horizontal plane of mean high water
changes with erosion and accretion, seasonal variations in
the beach, wind, waves, storms and man-made changes to
the beach—anything that changes the profile of the
beach. . . . It follows that even the most accurate
determination of the [mean high water line] for a dynamic
sandy beach is no more than a snapshot of the boundary at
that particular time and place.54
Due to the constantly changing nature of the mean high water line
boundary, the boundary does not provide a clear on/off signal. Thus
there are difficulties enforcing laws against trespassing in coastal states
that use the mean high water line as the boundary.55 For example, in
State v. Ibbison,56 six defendants cleaning up a beach in Rhode Island
were charged with criminal trespass on the basis that they had ventured
onto private oceanfront property.57 After holding that the boundary
50. 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89; see also FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 78 (“[T]here
are two physical components of any water boundary determination: the landform’s elevation,
slope, and composition and the relative elevation of the water level that impresses itself against
the landform.”).
51. 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89; see also Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 174, 181
(Tex. 1958) (describing processes for determining the mean high water); GEORGE M. COLE,
WATER BOUNDARIES 15–17 (1997); FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 117–18.
52. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 117, 118 n.83.
53. Christie, supra note 2, at 33–34; see also COLE, supra note 51, at 45.
54. Christie, supra note 2, at 34 (footnote omitted); see also COLE, supra note 51, at 42,
45; FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 90, 126; 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89–90.
55. A.though the boundary between public and private property on ocean shores may be
especially difficult to ascertain, there are other boundaries that also are unclear and costly to
specify. Inland boundaries may be unclear and costly to ascertain, and identifying boundaries in
intellectual property may entail search costs. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296–99 (2008).
56. 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).
57. Id. at 729.
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between private and public property is the mean high tide line, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the trespass
charges.58 The court held that the boundary “is not readily identifiable
by the casual observer”59 and that “due process provides that no man
shall be held criminally responsible for conduct that he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.”60
Despite the current preference for an ambulatory legal boundary, the
idea of fixing the boundary along the shores is not unknown.61
Reminiscent of Roman law, the common law provides two main options
to address changes along ocean shores that affect the boundary.62 Under
the doctrine of avulsion, after any changes to the shoreline deemed to be
avulsive, the legal boundary remains the preexisting mean high water
line.63 Second, under the doctrine of accretion,64 any changes deemed to
be accretive cause the legal boundary to shift to the new mean high
water line.65 Courts today exhibit a strong presumption for applying
58. Id. at 732–33.
59. Id. at 732.
60. Id. at 733. For a fascinating discussion of State v. Ibbison and its implications for the
beach, see Thompson, supra note 9; cf. Christie, supra note 2, at 35–36 (discussing the
confusion even courts have with ambulatory seashore boundaries). Enforcement of trespass laws
on the beach also has given rise to controversy in Florida. See Christie, supra note 2, at 34–36,
and Crystal Dunes Owners Ass’n Inc. v. City of Destin, Florida, 476 F. App’x 180, 182 (11th
Cir. 2012) (dismissing beachfront property owners’ procedural due process and equal protection
challenges to a city policy refusing to enforce “trespass laws within twenty feet of the wet
sand’s edge”). For background on the use of criminal trespass statutes, see THOMAS W. MERRILL
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 369–71 (2d ed. 2012). We thank
Donna Christie for referring us to the Crystal Dunes Owners case.
61. However, there could be legal obstacles to generically fixing the boundary between
private and public trust property. Fixing the boundary might constitute a taking if, for example,
fixing the boundary deprived landowners of the right to accretions. Christie, supra note 2, at 36–
37 (referring to the Justice Stewart’s dissent in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967)).
Also, state lawmakers could not fix the boundary that applied to federal grants of land. Id. at 36
(drawing on Hughes v. Washington).
62. On the Roman law principles, see G. INST. 2.70, 2.71; and J. INST. 2.1.20, 2.1.21,
2.1.23, 2.1.24. Epstein helpfully discusses the Roman law of alluvion and avulsion. Epstein,
supra note 11, at 49–55; Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in
Land and Water, in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 317, 319, 321, 342 (Daniel H.
Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012).
63. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2599 (2010) (noting that following “an avulsive event[,] . . . the boundary between littoral
property and sovereign land does not change; it remains (ordinarily) what was the mean highwater line before the event”).
64. As noted above, we use the term “accretion” to encompass both accretion and erosion.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
65. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598 (“In Florida, as at common law, the
littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by accretion . . . .”);
FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 96. Apart from situations deemed avulsion, there are other
exceptions where accretive changes may not lead to a change in the boundary. See id. at 96–97,
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accretion and preserving an ambulatory boundary.66 A leading treatise
on water boundaries goes so far as to suggest that “there is some
question as to whether” “the doctrine of avulsion applies to open coast
lands,” indicating that “[i]n California there are no reported cases, and
one court in Texas has expressed the view that the rule of avulsion may
not apply to the tidal coastline.”67 Florida applies the doctrine of
avulsion to the coasts,68 but even Florida seems to presume a migratory
boundary.69
Even if avulsion applies to coastal shores in a state, the distinction
between it and accretion is not always clear, which leaves the courts
scope to characterize changes as accretion and thus maintain a
migratory boundary. Doctrinally, accretion and erosion encompass
“gradual and imperceptible” changes to the land.70 Accretion refers to
129–34.
66. There are many references to the contemporary presumption in favor of accretion and
erosion and the resulting migratory boundary, as compared with avulsion and the fixed
boundary that it brings. E.g., FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 100, 134–35; Christie, supra note 2, at
27; Sax, supra note 11, at 346, 354; cf. Kalo, supra note 49, at 1440–44 (concluding that North
Carolina, by statute, abandoned the avulsion rule and consequently that the legal boundary
between private and public trust property ambulates in accordance with the mean high tide line
regardless of the reason for the shift).
67. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 134 (footnote omitted). A 2012 decision of the Texas
Supreme Court provides further evidence of the strong legal preference for a migrating
boundary between private and public trust property. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705
(Tex. 2012). The issue in the case was whether, after a hurricane, a public beachfront access
easement on a privately owned portion of the dry beach rolled landward onto another parcel of
private property that was never burdened by an easement. Id. at 708. The majority held that the
public beachfront access easement did not roll landward onto the other parcel because the
change to the shore was avulsion. Id. at 724–25. In the course of holding that the easement did
not roll, the majority indicated that “[t]he division between public and private ownership
remains at the mean high tide line in the wake of naturally occurring changes, and even when
boundaries seem to change suddenly.” Id. at 725. It also indicated that “[w]e have never applied
the avulsion doctrine to upset the mean high tide line boundary.” Id. at 722. However in a
footnote, the majority suggested that it was not definitively deciding that avulsion would never
freeze the boundary between private and public trust property. After it indicated that “[s]ome
states apply avulsion to determine that the mean high tide line as it existed before the avulsive
event remains the boundary between public and private ownership of beach property after the
avulsive event,” the majority stated that “[w]e have not accepted such an expansive view of the
doctrine, but we need not make that determination in this case.” Id. at 722 n.20.
68. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 134; Christie, supra note 13, at 27; see also Siesta Props.,
Inc. v. Hart, 122 So. 2d 218, 223–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (applying avulsion to islands);
Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986) (applying avulsion to
artificially induced changes); City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 552–54 (N.J.
2010) (applying avulsion to beach renourishment).
69. Mun. Liquidators, Inc. v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(“[T]here is a presumption of accretion or erosion as against avulsion.”); accord Schulz v. City
of Dania, 156 So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see also FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at
99–100; Christie, supra note 2, at 28 n.54.
70. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 92–93.
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gradual and imperceptible “deposition[s]” to the shore,71 and erosion to
“the gradual and imperceptible wearing away or loss of littoral or
riparian land by the action of the water.”72 Avulsion refers to “the rapid,
perceptible, and often violent removal of or addition to land due to the
action of water, or the sudden and perceptible change in the physical
location of the boundary watercourse.”73 The neat doctrinal distinction
between “gradual and imperceptible” and “rapid, perceptible, and often
violent” changes is not straightforward in practice.74 Indeed, there are
some strongly counterintuitive holdings, such as a Texas decision that
found changes following hurricanes, which seem sudden and violent,
were properly characterized as erosion.75
When upland private landowners lose property because the changes
are legally treated as accretion, the state acquires the property subject to
the public trust. However, the state is not required to compensate private
landowners for the loss of their land. To quote Professor Peter Byrne,
“[a]ccretionary loss has never been considered a taking, constitutionally
requiring public compensation because nature, rather than the state,
effects the deprivation. Loss of littoral land through accretion might be
71. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 92. Accretion was historically distinguished from
“reliction,” which occurs when “lands once covered by water . . . become dry when the water
recedes.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2598 (2010). Reliction and accretion generally receive the same treatment by courts. FLUSHMAN,
supra note 6, at 97; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598 (referring “to
accretions and relictions collectively as accretions”). Flushman indicates that “[t]he process of
reliction is not one associated with lands along the open coast.” FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at
133.
72. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 93. “Littoral property abuts the sea or a lake, while
riparian property abuts rivers.” Sax, supra note 11, at 306 n.3.
73. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 94 (footnote omitted); see also Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598.
74. For discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing between accretive and avulsive
changes, see Southern Center of Theosophy Inc. v. South Australia [1982] ACLR 706, 721
(Austl.) (“Since there is a logical, and practical, gap or ‘grey area’ between what is
imperceptible and what is to be considered as ‘avulsion,’ the issue of imperceptibility or
otherwise was always considered to be a jury question . . . .”); Attorney-General v. M’Carthy
[1911] 2 I.R. 260, 296 (Ir.) (“The difficulty is, [w]hat is the unit or measure of time for ‘gradual
and imperceptible’? . . . . Justinian and Bracton attempt no definition.”); FLUSHMAN, supra note
6, at 98–99 (discussing the difficulty); Sax, supra note 11, at 343–46 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s broadening of “the definition of accretion”); A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights,
and Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REV. 731, 745 (2012) (“The distinction [between
‘accretion/erosion and avulsion’] is often hard to discern.”).
75. City of Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)
(“[E]rosion can be both sudden and perceptible, and does not have to be always gradual and
imperceptible”). In holding that the changes were not avulsive, the Texas court also emphasized
that there were several causes of changes along the shore, not all of which were hurricanes. Id.;
see also Christie, supra note 2, at 52 n.229. For a judicial reference to a hurricane as an example
of avulsion, see City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 551 (N.J. 2010).
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understood to be a risk that ‘inheres in the title’ to such land.”76
II. RATIONALES FOR AN AMBULATORY COASTAL BOUNDARY
This Part turns to the reasons why an ambulatory coastal boundary
is likely efficient. We begin by analyzing five existing rationales for a
migratory boundary and arguing that they can be understood in
efficiency terms. Then we offer our own explanation for why a
migratory boundary likely is efficient, drawing on themes that emerge
from considering the existing rationales.
A. Existing Rationales
In a recent article, Professor Joseph Sax helpfully returns to the
English and American historical authorities discussing the rules of
accretion and avulsion “in an effort to understand something about how
and why they developed as they did, with the hope that greater
understanding might ultimately generate better outcomes.”77 His
analysis indicates that various rationales have been offered over the
centuries for accretion, and our discussion in this section is indebted to
his masterful efforts bringing together the authorities.78
Below we show that five rationales for accretion either identified by
Sax or present in the materials that he discusses each can be understood
in economic terms to reflect a concern with promoting efficiency. This
Article does not suggest that the various authorities that deployed these
rationales were solely concerned with promoting efficiency or even
consciously interested in promoting efficiency. Nor does this Article
argue that a shift in the legal boundary to accord with natural changes
will result in an efficient outcome in every case. We contend, however,
that these five rationales reflect a concern with promoting efficiency,
and thus that efficiency is an underlying, if unarticulated, justification
76. Byrne, supra note 11, at 80 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029 (1992)); see also id. at 100; Tarlock, supra note 74, at 741; Titus, supra note 8, at 1339
(“An invasion by the sea due to natural factors is not a constitutional taking.”) (citing Cinque
Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 519–20 (Miss. 1986) (en banc)); id. at 1286,
1371–84, 1388–91. Titus cautions that “some states may be waiving” their “common law right
to require shorefront owners to abandon property as shores erode.” Id. at 1376.
For a contrasting perspective, see Hiatt, supra note 25, at 372 (suggesting that there might
be a taking when, due to sea level rise, governments acquire newly submerged private lands
pursuant to the public trust doctrine, but arguing “that it should not be considered a taking when
a state takes title or asserts control over private lands submerged due to climate change and
large-scale sea level rise”).
77. Sax, supra note 11, at 307–08. For a useful discussion of the Roman authorities, see
Epstein, supra note 11, at 47–57.
78. Other sources provide similar lists of rationales for the doctrine of accretion, generally
drawing on modern U.S. law. See, e.g., 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at
§ 66.01[3]; Beck, supra note 35, at 431–39; Christie, supra note 2, at 28–29.
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for an ambulatory boundary between private and public trust property.79
79. In a recent article, Professor Thomas Merrill offers an efficiency explanation for the
principle of accession, for which he believes the doctrine of accretion is an example. Merrill,
supra note 11, at 465–66. Merrill uses accretion to refer specifically to the doctrine “that a
riparian landowner whose land is gradually augmented by alluvial formations owns the newly
formed land,” not broadly as we do in this Article to encompass the legal rules of accretion and
erosion. Id. at 465. Professor Merrill argues that the principle of accession is an alternative to
“first possession” “for establishing original ownership” and defines the principle in these terms:
“When new resources are discovered or changes in relative values cause previously ignored
questions of ownership to become salient, the newly discovered or newly salient resource is
awarded to the person who owns as property some other resource prominently connected with
the newly discovered or salient thing.” Id. at 463.
Our analysis suggests that the doctrine of accretion as applied on the nation’s coastal shores
is not best understood as an example of the principle of accession, interpreted “as a principle of
acquisition.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 170 (indicating that the casebook “explore[s]
the principle of accession as a principle of acquisition but” that “[a]ccession can be seen as
defining the scope of property claims”); see also Merrill, supra note 11, at 481 (contrasting the
two understandings of accession). Rather than a principle for awarding ownership to a new
resource, accretion is one of the legal rules for drawing boundary lines between private and
public landholdings in response to continuous physical changes on the coasts, with erosion
being another important rule. Our understanding of accretion as a rule of boundary
determination suggests that it may be serving the function of “defining the scope of property
claims,” to use the language of MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 170.
In a law review article from the 1960s, Professor Robert Beck rejects the idea of
analogizing accretion to accession. Beck, supra note 35, at 432. Influenced by his work, we
believe that there are two difficulties with Professor Merrill’s analysis of accretion as accession.
First, the analysis presumes that when land is added to the shore, there is only a single
landowner to whom the land could be assigned because there is only a single landowner who
can claim to be “prominently connected” to the new land through an existing resource. Merrill,
supra note 11, at 463; see also id. at 466 (“[T]he new soil always goes to the riparian owner on
whose banks the new land is attached, who readily can be said to have the most prominent
relationship to it.”); MERRILL & SMITH , supra note 60, at 183 (discussing “the logic” behind
thinking “of accretion as an example of the principle of accession”). However, when land is
added to the coast there will be two potential owners: the private landowner who owns the
upland property, and the state that owns the wet beach and submerged lands in trust for the
public. There is no reason to think that only the private landowner is prominently connected to
the new land. Beck, supra note 35, at 432 (“[W]hy should the alluvion belong to the owner of
the contiguous land instead of to the owner of the bed? Was it not ‘acceding’ or ‘accreting’ or
‘adding’ just as much to the bed as to the contiguous land?”). Indeed, we might think that the
state, as the owner of the submerged lands on behalf of the public, has a greater claim to the
accreted land than the private landowner because the newly added sediment might have come
from the state-owned submerged lands. See Christie, supra note 2, at 28 (excerpting JOSEPH K.
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES
THEREOF 68 (Harrison Gray ed., 1826)). As Beck argues, “[T]here must have been something
more than simply the theory of analogy to accession that led to preferring the riparian owner
over the owner of the bed.” Beck, supra note 35, at 432. For a decision that illustrates the
presence of two landowners, see United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009)
(protecting the tideland owner’s right to an ambulatory boundary).
Second, analyzing the doctrine of accretion as an instance of accession overlooks the
existence of its companion, the doctrine of erosion, and the legal presumption in favor of
accretion and erosion and against avulsion. Accretion, erosion, and this presumption help to
ensure that the boundary line between private and public property generally migrates along with
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One longstanding rationale for an ambulatory boundary is that
gradual and imperceptible changes to the shoreline likely have a “de
minimis impact.”80 This rationale does not easily explain cases where
courts apply accretion but shift the ownership of sizeable parcels of
land.81 Nonetheless, the idea that the legal boundary should track de
minimis changes reflects a concern with efficiency. If the change
wrought by nature is genuinely negligible, then the change should not
affect the value of either the private or the public trust property.
Moreover, because identifying the current ordinary high water mark is
simpler than specifying the historic ordinary high water mark, shifting
the legal boundary to accord with the current ordinary high water mark
also should reduce administrative costs.82
A second longstanding rationale for a shifting boundary is that
accretion results in a “lost boundary.”83 The idea “is that where
accretion or reliction [and erosion] occurred very slowly over a very
long time, there was no longer evidence or knowledge of the location of
the original boundary.”84 As with the de minimis rationale, it may be
hard to explain the cases using the lost boundary rationale because
courts seem to have shifted the boundary even where the old border was
knowable.85 Regardless of whether it makes sense of the case law, in
physical changes along the shores. The doctrine of accretion necessarily allocates new land to
the upland private owner, but this is incidental to the doctrine’s larger role in implementing a
migratory boundary. As we emphasize, the migratory boundary that accretion helps to achieve is
likely to be efficient along the coast because of the importance of maintaining private and public
water adjacency and the administrative advantages of aligning the legal boundary with the status
quo on the beach. Analyzing accretion as a “principle of acquisition” obscures accretion’s role
as a rule of boundary determination that fosters a migrating border between private and public
landowners on the beach to the benefit of both sides.
80. Sax, supra note 11, at 320; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262
(noting the accretion rule applies because “de minimis non curat lex”). Professor Joseph Sax
notes that the de minimis rationale was “cast away” by the court in The King v. Lord
Yarborough, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 668 (K.B.); 3 B. & C. 91. Sax, supra note 11, at 332.
However, there are later references in case law to the de minimis rationale. S. Ctr. of Theosophy
Inc. v. South Australia [1982] ACLR 706, 721 (Austl.).
81. Notably, Professor Sax offers a way to reconcile the de minimis rationale and shifting
the ownership of sizeable parcels of land. According to his reading, early English cases found
accretion where the land at issue was “de minimis in terms of sovereign interest, even if not de
minimis in monetary value or acreage.” Sax, supra note 11, at 329. Indeed, “the amounts of land
in controversy were . . . often substantial in size.” Id. at 313. For example, in Lord Yarborough’s
case, the court found accretion where “alluvion . . . had gradually filled a salt marsh of 453
acres.” Id. at 330–31.
82. See COLE, supra note 51, at 93–104 (discussing how to find historic shoreline
boundaries); FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 135–38 (same).
83. Sax, supra note 11, at 313. Professor Sax notes that the lost boundary rationale was
“cast away” alongside the de minimis rationale in Lord Yarborough’s case. Id. at 332.
84. Id. at 312. For a definition of reliction, see supra note 71.
85. Beck, supra note 35, at 433 (“[T]here are many cases involving fixed boundaries
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economic terms the lost boundary rationale reflects a concern with
minimizing administrative costs. Aligning the legal boundary with the
natural boundary of the current mean high water line avoids the
difficulty of ascertaining an historic borderline, when evidence and
knowledge of it have been lost or would be costly to acquire because of
the passage of time.86 In other words, an ambulatory boundary offers
another example of the pervasive influence of information costs in
property law emphasized by Professor Henry Smith and Professor
Thomas Merrill.87
A third rationale for a shifting coastal boundary is what Professor
Sax terms the “reciprocity rationale.”88 The idea is that the private
landowner should receive the benefit of any additions because the
landowner also bears the risk of any reduction, and vice versa.89
Blackstone includes the reciprocity rationale in his discussion of
accretion and avulsion.90 The U.S. Supreme Court explained the
which could be identified without great difficulty after a shift in the water line that hold that the
accretion doctrine applies.”); see, e.g., Att’y-Gen. v. M’Carthy [1911] 2 I.R. 260, 276, 294 (Ir.)
(title shifted even though the old boundary may have been knowable); S. Ctr. of Theosophy Inc.
v. South Australia [1982] A.C. 706, 716 (Austl.) (“The authorities . . . . have firmly laid down
that where land is granted with a water boundary, the title of the grantee extends to that land as
added to or detracted from by accretion, or diluvion, and that this is so whether or not the grant
is accompanied by a map showing the boundary, or contains a parcels clause stating the area of
the land, and whether or not the original boundary can be identified.”). Professor Sax argues that
the decision in Attorney-General v. M’Carthy indicates “that by the early twentieth century, the
lost-boundary theory had been decisively rejected” in the English courts. Sax, supra note 11, at
335.
86. See COLE, supra note 51, at 93–104 (discussing the determination of historic
boundaries).
87. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More
Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77, S90–91, S95, S98–99 (2011). For a definition of information
costs, see Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1768 (“Information costs include
the cost of producing and verifying information about the scope and security of rights.”).
88. Sax, supra note 11, at 312, 340. The rationale is also called “the compensation theory”
or “equity theory.” Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), overruled on other
grounds by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977);
FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 253; 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3].
89. Sax, supra note 11, at 312, 320; Byrne, supra note 11, at 95.
90. Specifically, Blackstone says:
And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of
sand and earth, so as in time to make terra firma; or by dereliction, as when the
sea shrinks back below the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held to
be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it
shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de minimis non curat lex: and,
besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea, or at
charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration
for such possible charge or loss.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261–62 (footnote omitted).
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rationale in the following terms in the late nineteenth century:
The riparian right to future alluvion is a vested
right. . . . The maxim “qui sentit onus debet sentire
commodum” lies at its foundation. The owner takes the
chances of injury and of benefit arising from the situation
of the property. If there be a gradual loss, he must bear it; if
a gradual gain, it is his.91
There are several ways of understanding the reciprocity rationale.
One might understand it as a justice (or fairness) based rationale,
reflecting the idea that a lottery in which there is an equal probability of
winning or losing is “fair.”92 Although the Court did not explicitly state
in the above quoted passage that there is an equal probability of a gain
or loss, it seems implicit in doctrinal expositions of the rationale.93
The reciprocity rationale also can be understood in economic terms
as promoting efficiency. Property rights help to overcome the “tragedy
of the commons” because they internalize onto owners the gains and
losses that result from their management decisions.94 By assigning
91. Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68–69 (1874). The Supreme
Court also mentioned the reciprocity rationale in an earlier decision. Mayor of New Orleans v.
United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 717 (1836).
Professors Powell and Wolf indicate that the rationale “has received only modest judicial
support.” 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]. However, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently invoked the reciprocity rationale to protect the interests of a
Native American tribe in tidelands held in trust for it by the United States. United States v.
Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1186–88 (9th Cir. 2009). The court reasoned that, just as upland owners
are entitled to gains from accretion because they also run the risk of losing land to erosion, so
the tideland owner also “has a vested right in the potential gains that accrue from the movement
of the boundary line.” Id. at 1187–88.
92. See, e.g., Milner, 583 F.3d at 1188 (referring to reciprocity as “the fairness rationale”);
City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 550 (N.J. 2010) (“The doctrine of accretion
and erosion is founded ‘on the principle of natural justice’ . . . .”); S. Ctr. of Theosophy Inc. v.
South Australia [1982] A.C. 706, 716 (Austl.) (referring to the idea that a landowner takes
subject to “subtractions and additions” as “fair,” “convenient,” and “founded in justice”); Byrne,
supra note 25, at 633 (“One can understand the intuitive justice, all other things being equal, of
allowing party A to obtain the benefit of random shifts in property boundaries if party A must
tolerate losses from the same risk.”).
On the idea of a “fair lottery,” see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just
Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO. 483, 485–92 (1988). Kornhauser and Sager state:
In the very idea of a “fair” coin or die there inheres the element that drives our
naive view of what makes a lottery itself fair, equiprobability: when and only
when a lottery’s payoff condition gives each member of the pool an objectively
equal chance to receive the benefit do we think of the lottery as fair.
Id. at 485.
93. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 326.
94. For discussion of the internalization function of property, see Merrill, supra note 11,
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territorial gains and losses to owners, a rule that the legal boundary
generally moves with natural forces may incentivize owners to make
socially optimal investment decisions about their parcels by putting
owners on notice that the size of their parcels will vary with changes
wrought by nature. How owners respond to the risks of territorial gains
or losses will depend on their attitudes toward risk. If there truly is an
equal probability of a loss or a gain, risk-neutral owners will make
decisions regarding their land unaffected by the risk of losing or gaining
property. If the owners are risk averse, however, they will likely focus
on the possibility of losing a part of the parcel, and accordingly reduce
investment in the property, or invest in protection measures.95 Riskpreferring owners might actively invest in coastal property.
A fourth rationale for an ambulatory coastal boundary is that shifting
the border may reward a littoral landowner for putting any accreted
property to use. The idea that underlies “the use/prescription theory,”96
as Professor Sax calls it, is “that when the pace of change is very
gradual, the adjacent owner effectively takes over the newly exposed
land unperceived and uses it as his own.”97 The notion that use of land
should be remunerated could be understood in Lockean terms as a
reward for labor,98 but there is also an efficiency dimension to
rewarding use. It may incentivize landowners to put land to productive
use, which might encourage economic development and growth. As the
House of Lords explained in Lord Yarborough’s case, “This custom is
beneficial to the public. Much land which would remain for years,
perhaps for ever [sic], barren, is in consequence of this custom rendered
productive as soon as it is formed.”99 Further, the transfer of title will
at 494, and Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1755.
95. Professor Steven Shavell explains that “[r]isk aversion is most relevant in situations in
which losses would be large in relation to a person’s assets and thus would impinge
substantially on his utility. . . . If, however, losses would be modest relative to a person’s assets,
he would be likely to display a roughly risk-neutral attitude toward them.” STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258 (2004). Experimental findings suggest that
many people are risk averse. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive
Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1653–54 (2002).
96. Sax, supra note 11, at 325. Professors Powell and Wolf refer to this as the
“productivity or efficiency theory.” 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 35, at § 66.01[3].
97. Sax, supra note 11, at 323 (discussing the conclusion of Robert Callis, one of the
earliest English commentators on moving water boundaries).
98. Gifford v. Lord Yarborough, (1828) 130 Eng. Reg. 1023 (H.L.) 1024; 5 Bing. 163,
165–66 (U.K.) (quoting philosopher John Locke in support of the idea that a private landowner
should be granted title to land added to his property through the deposit of alluvion).
99. Id. at 166. Professors Powell and Wolf describe this passage as “[t]he clearest
statement of the efficiency argument.” 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at
§ 66.01[3] n.32.
Beck discusses a statement of “the ‘productivity’ theory” in Jefferis v. East Omaha Land
Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890). Beck, supra note 35, at 434 & n.27. This passage from Jefferis states
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reward the private landowner without imposing significant costs on the
losing party, namely, the state. The state will probably not be making
much, if any, use of the land by the time of the transfer if the winning
landowner has been using the land.100 To the extent that the
“use/prescription” rationale emphasizes the lack of a loss to the state, it
blends with the de minimis rationale.101
It is not clear, however, that the use/prescription theory explains the
modern preference for an ambulatory boundary.102 The theory reflects a
dated policy in favor of active use. Today society recognizes that
nonuse of land, including coastal land, also may be efficient.103 In
addition, the rationale cannot explain the entire range of circumstances
when the boundary migrates. It might explain why the boundary
ambulates when an upland parcel is enlarged through the addition of
land (accretion in its narrow sense) because in this situation the private
owner may have the opportunity to use the new parcel. But the rationale
does not explain why the boundary ambulates when the private
landowner loses part of his parcel through erosion, because there is no
opportunity for private use when land is lost.
A fifth rationale for an ambulatory boundary is that it simultaneously
preserves the private landowner’s “proximity [. . .] to the water”104 and
that “it is the interest of the community that all lands should have an owner, and most
convenient that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the shore.” Jefferis,
134 U.S. at 191. Earlier in Jefferis, the almost identical language is used in a quotation from
Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67 (1865)). Id. at 189. Professor Sax suggests that the
passage from Banks might allude to the water adjacency rationale. Sax, supra note 11, at 348 &
n.241.
100. Professor Sax suggests another reason why awarding the land to the private landowner
may not be costly for the state: “The gradualness of the process also diminishes the sense of loss
by the loser.” Sax, supra note 11, at 324.
The use/prescription theory is interesting in light of the traditional common law
“presumption that adverse possession does not apply to the government.” MERRILL & SMITH,
supra note 60, at 202; see also id. (noting that some states have “modified” or “abolished” the
presumption against adverse possession of government owned lands).
101. See Beck, supra note 35, at 434 (suggesting that “the ‘productivity’ theory” and “the
de minimis theory . . . are in fact one”); Sax, supra note 11, at 342 (suggesting that the
use/prescription rationale approaches the de minimis rationale in stating that “[h]aving happened
so insensibly, the change is not perceived as having changed the status quo ante, and is thus
effectively de minimis.”).
102. See Christie, supra note 2, at 29 (“The primary value of riparian or littoral land is not
that it may produce more land, and the policy for recognizing the right to accreted land is not to
encourage the filling of submerged land or creation of more land, but to provide access to the
water.” (footnote omitted)).
103. For example, preserving or rebuilding wetlands or dunes may help communities better
withstand the effects of climate change. Byrne, supra note 11, at 87, 93; see also Ruhl &
Salzman, supra note 33, at 230–37 (arguing for recognition of economic value of the nonuse of
coastal land under the public trust doctrine).
104. Sax, supra note 11, at 308 n.8 (citing FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 253).
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the public’s access to the water.105 Preservation of the private
landowner’s adjacency to the water is likely efficient because “wateradjacency is central to the value and use of riparian/littoral property.”106
Protection of the public’s access to the water is also likely efficient
because of the value of public access to tidal and navigable waters for
navigation, recreation, commerce, fishing, and other purposes. Case law
refers to the protection of the private owner’s water adjacency as a
rationale for an ambulatory boundary.107 Indeed, Professor Sax and
other commentators seem to agree that preservation of the private
owner’s adjacency to the shore underlies the modern preference for an
ambulatory boundary.108 The ability of the ambulatory boundary to
simultaneously safeguard the public’s access to the water seems less
widely recognized.109
To see how an ambulating boundary protects both private and public
105. Professor Eagle indicates that “the basic proposition of the [public trust] doctrine
[is] that the public has the right to access and to use public waterways.” EAGLE, supra note 5, at
185 (emphasis omitted).
106. Sax, supra note 11, at 313; see also FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 87; 9 POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]; Christie, supra note 2, at 21, 29; Kalo, supra note
49, at 1436 n.27.
107. E.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), overruled on other
grounds by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977);
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1142
(Minn. 1893); Att’y-Gen. of S. Nigeria v. John Holt & Co. (Liverpool) [1915] A.C. 599, 612
(P.C.) (appeal taken from S. Nigeria).
108. 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]; Beck, supra note 35, at
438; Kalo, supra note 49, at 1442–44; Sax, supra note 11, at 313, 347–48. Other sources refer to
the benefits that an ambulatory boundary has for private landowners. See FLUSHMAN, supra note
6, at 100; Christie, supra note 2, at 29.
Professor Sax indicates that “none of the old cases or old writers” refer to preservation of
water adjacency as a rationale to shift the legal boundary. Sax, supra note 11, at 326. He
speculates that “[p]robably the reason our modern concern with riparian/littoral access to water
was not a consideration in earlier times is that in those days, such land was used primarily as
forage, rather than for boating or for access related to modern recreational use of the shore.” Id.
at 347 (footnote omitted). Rose suggests that “[b]each recreation” came “into vogue” in the late
eighteenth or early nineteenth century in England. See Rose, supra note 9, at 757.
109. Professor Sax refers to benefits that an ambulatory boundary has for the public as well
as private landowners. Sax, supra note 11, at 353 (noting that “maintaining water adjacency for
riparian/littoral landowners and assuring public use of overlying water (and some part of the
foreshore) are the central goals of the law relating to migratory waters”); see also Titus, supra
note 8, at 1370 (“When a shore retreats, the boundaries retreat—regardless of whether the
erosion is natural or anthropogenic. Were it otherwise, the public trust rights, such as lateral
beach access, would be routinely eliminated . . . .”).
There also are references in case law to the benefits for the public of maintaining a
migratory boundary. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 318 (“In order for the States to
guarantee full public enjoyment of their navigable watercourses, it has been held that their title
to the bed of a navigable river mechanically follows the river’s gradual changes in course.”
(footnote omitted)).
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trust property, it is helpful to distinguish the effects of an ambulating
boundary when land is added to the shore through accretion, and when
land leaves the shore through erosion. When land is added to the shore,
private landowners risk losing their adjacency to the sea if the new land
becomes the property of the state. The new land could separate
landowners’ property from the ocean.110 Giving landowners title
preserves their adjacency to the ocean without interfering with the
public’s interests in using the water and the wet beach that the public
trust historically protects.111
When the upland parcel is diminished through erosion, a landward
shift of the legal boundary to accord with the new mean high water line
diminishes the area under private control. But shifting the legal
boundary does not remove the water adjacency that is central to the
value of the private property, assuming that the landowner’s parcel is
not entirely eroded.112 A shift in the legal boundary is probably
necessary to preserve the public uses that make public trust property
valuable.113 If the boundary remained the historic mean high water line,
parts of the wet beach and tidal and navigable waters could come under
private control, which would mean that private landowners could create
110. “The effect of [the application of the avulsion rule to an increase to the beach] would
be to destroy the littoral owner’s common law littoral rights, including the private littoral right
of direct access to the ocean, and to create a ribbon of state-owned, dry sand beach.” Kalo,
supra note 49, at 1442; see also Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1142 (describing as “mischief[] . . . if a
riparian owner is liable to be cut off from access to the water, and another owner sandwiched in
between him and it”).
111. For an indication that the interests of the adjoining private and public landowners
figure in judicial boundary determinations, see Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 328 (“[A]n analysis of the
interests of the State and Bonelli [the private landowner,] . . . compels the conclusion that
. . . title to the disputed land should be vested in Bonelli . . . . The State’s acquisition of the
exposed land here could only be a windfall, since unnecessary to the State’s purpose in holding
title to the beds of the navigable streams within its borders.”).
As discussed further below, in some circumstances it may be possible to allocate “new
land” to the public (using the doctrine of avulsion) without undermining the private landowner’s
property values. For example, courts have deemed beach renourishment to be avulsion, thereby
freezing the boundary at the pre-existing mean high water line and assigning the renourished
beach to the public rather than the private owner. Beach renourishment may protect the value of
private property because it reduces erosion. Also, renourishment programs may include
measures to protect private owners’ access to, and views of, the water that reduce the impact on
property values. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 553, 555 (N.J. 2010);
Christie, supra note 2, at 42.
112. Natural forces can inflict significant losses on landowners. For example, part of the
backdrop to Severance v. Patterson was that the “property” of Severance’s neighbor was
“devastated” by Hurricane Rita. 370 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. 2012). The hurricane “moved the
line of vegetation landward” and left “[t]he entirety of the house on Severance’s Kennedy Drive
property . . . seaward of the vegetation line. The State [of Texas] claimed a portion of her
property was located on a public beachfront easement and a portion of her house interfered with
the public’s use of the dry beach.” Id.
113. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 9, at 780.
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barriers to the public using these areas for public trust uses such as
navigation, commerce, and recreation. An important reason for the
public trust over lands underlying tidal and navigable waters is that
private owners of these areas might have an incentive to act as holdouts
and block access for uses such as navigation and recreation that require
consistent public access along long stretches.114
Our discussion so far has focused on five existing rationales for an
ambulatory boundary. While not all of these rationales provide
satisfactory accounts of the existing case law, each demonstrates a
concern with promoting efficiency.
B. The Efficiency of Migratory Coastal Boundaries
We now turn to our own explanation of why the current legal
preference for a migratory coastal boundary is likely efficient in present
circumstances. Our explanation draws on the economic interpretations
offered above of the five rationales for a migratory boundary.
Our starting point is that the existing presumption in the law for an
ambulatory boundary is efficient because it is sufficiently strong to
constitute a reasonably clear rule.115 A clear legal rule provides parties
with notice and enables them to adjust their behavior and investments. It
should also minimize disputes.116 Of course, freezing the legal boundary
at the historic mean high water line under the doctrine of avulsion also
114. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1230 (2012) (“A key justification for
sovereign ownership of navigable riverbeds is that a contrary rule would allow private riverbed
owners to erect improvements on the riverbeds that could interfere with the public’s right to use
the waters as a highway for commerce.”); Epstein, supra note 33, at 415; Rose, supra note 9, at
750. In Severance v. Patterson, the majority notes that fixing the boundary using avulsion may
“allow[] private property owners to retain ownership of property that becomes submerged under
the ocean.” 370 S.W.3d at 722 n.20; see also Jefferis v. E. Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 189
(1890).
115. Professor Sax alludes to the clarity benefits of the doctrines of accretion and avulsion.
Sax, supra note 11, at 348 n.241 (“[T]he accretion/avulsion rule is designed to identify a clear
owner according to a specified set of rules.”).
We describe the presumption for an ambulatory boundary as “a reasonably clear rule”
because there remains the possibility that rather than applying accretion, a court might apply the
doctrine of avulsion, which fixes the legal boundary at the historic mean high water line. We do
not intend to imply that there are no controversies about whether a physical change along the
shore should alter the legal boundary between private and public landowners. See Sax, supra
note 11, at 351 (indicating that “the deeply rooted doctrinal ‘accretion/avulsion’
distinction . . . continues to generate a good deal of wasteful litigation”).
116. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21–36
(1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1985) (“[L]ow-cost mechanical entitlement-determination rules play
an important role in facilitating the exchange and modification of property rights . . . .”); Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 969–71 (1979) (discussing the implications of “vague” legal rules for “private
ordering”).
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would be a clear rule that would provide notice and presumably reduce
disputes. But freezing the legal boundary would sacrifice the benefits of
shifting the boundary to accord with natural changes.
Two benefits of an ambulatory boundary are particularly important
from an economic point of view. The first is the opportunity that a
migratory boundary affords to preserve the water adjacency of private
landowners, while simultaneously maintaining public access to the wet
beach and tidal and navigable waterways. We have already discussed
this advantage and will not repeat the points made above. The second
important benefit is the administrative advantages of defining the legal
boundary as the contemporary mean high water line rather than a
historic mean high water line. We will elaborate on these administrative
advantages because, while there are allusions to them in the case law
and commentary, we have not come across an extensive treatment of
them.117 Nonetheless, simultaneously preserving private water
adjacency and public access to the water and the wet beach likely is a
more important reason for the preference for a migratory boundary than
the administrative advantages of such a boundary. The greater
importance of the former is suggested by the judicial willingness to
maintain a migratory boundary even when the historical boundary is
knowable, and the administrative advantages of aligning the natural and
the legal boundaries are less evident.118
To grasp the administrative advantages of an ambulatory boundary,
it is useful to keep in mind that while there may be situations where the
historical boundary is marked, the historical boundary will most likely
be unknown.119 If a dispute arises where a historical boundary is
marked, it might be easier to enforce that historical boundary than to
undertake a survey to determine a boundary based on the current mean
117. See, e.g., Siesta Props., Inc. v. Hart, 122 So. 2d 218, 222–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(reversing the trial court, which held that “the law of avulsion insofar as it is attempted to be
applied in this case should be rejected as the law of Florida, partly . . . because of the
impracticality of applying it intelligently”); Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 718 (“[T]he boundary
remains fixed (relatively) at the mean high tide line. Any other approach would leave locating
that boundary to pure guesswork.” (citation omitted)); S. Ctr. of Theosophy Inc. v. South
Australia [1982] A.C. 706, 716 (Austl.) (“[I]t is manifestly convenient to continue to regard the
boundary between land and water as being where it is from day to day or year to year.”); Byrne,
supra note 11, at 81; Epstein, supra note 11, at 52 (awarding “alluvion” to riparian owners
yields “low administrative costs”); Sax, supra note 11, at 347 n.234 (discussing S. Ctr. of
Theosophy Inc. v. South Australia).
118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing judicial willingness to find
accretion even where the historic boundary is knowable).
119. See, e.g., 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89–90; Thompson, supra note 9, at 358
(“[T]o maintain accurate boundary markers on a beach face, the boundary would have to be
resurveyed after every winter storm (when a beach can become lower, flatter, and wider as
sediment is moved offshore) and even periodically during the calmer summer months (when the
beach tends to gain sediment and height).”).
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high water line.120 However, in the more likely case without a marked
historical boundary, it will be less information intensive to determine
the contemporary mean high water line boundary than to recreate a
boundary based on a historical mean high water line.
The difficulty in recreating a historical boundary is likely to be
determining the shape of the landform at the desired point in the past.
Historical tidal observations might be available to determine the vertical
component of the historical boundary (the height of the mean high tide)
because the federal government has monitored tides for over 150
years.121 But it will be difficult to fix the point along the shore where the
mean high water line historically intersected with the shore, because the
landform will have changed in the interim. To recreate the shore as it
stood in the past likely will require turning to old photographs, maps,
surveys, and archival records that may not provide especially “accurate
or precise” descriptions of the shore in the past.122 Even if a boundary
can be determined based on a historical mean water line, there may be
less confidence in the accuracy of this boundary than a boundary
determined based on a contemporary survey applying data about the
mean high water line to the current shore.123 Thus echoing a point made
earlier in the discussion of the lost boundary rationale, the legal
preference for a migratory boundary seems to be another illustration of
the influence of information costs on property law.124 It is the difficulty
of accessing information about preexisting landforms that complicates
the administrative use of a fixed, historic boundary.
We acknowledge that a migratory boundary has costs as well as
benefits. One of the disadvantages is the lack of certainty that a
migratory boundary provides private landowners and the public about
where private ownership begins and public ownership ends when they
walk along a beach, especially when the migratory boundary is the
mean high water line as opposed to the more visible vegetation line.125
As discussed earlier, the mean high water line is not a clear on/off
signal. There are problems with policing trespassing by members of the
120. One downside of applying the historical boundary is that it might distance one party
from the ocean and result in a loss of water adjacency.
121. Christie, supra note 2, at 33.
122. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 135–38. For a description of methods surveyors currently
use, see COLE, supra note 51, at 93–104.
123. The difficulty of determining a historic vegetation line boundary is captured by an
article discussing a 1966 Washington State Supreme Court decision that fixed the boundary
between private and public trust property as the vegetation line of 1889. The article asks
rhetorically, “The unanswered question remains: Can the vegetation line of 1889 in fact be
determined? If so, how?” Corker, supra note 43, at 91.
124. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
125. See Christie, supra note 2, at 72 (describing the “ocean boundaries” of “coastal land”
as “indeterminable to laymen—both littoral owners and beach users”).
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public onto private property in beach areas due to the uncertainty of the
boundary. But the benefits to private landowners—as well as the
public—of maintaining water adjacency and reducing the administrative
costs of determining the boundary may offset the costs of impinging on
the owner’s right to exclude stemming from the migratory mean high
water line. These benefits might be especially salient in an era when
coastal property is highly valued.126
If a migrating boundary is efficient, why do legal decision makers
sometimes freeze the boundary at a historic point, through statutes such
as the Florida legislation that provides the backdrop to the Stop the
Beach Renourishment case, or through common law decisions that
employ the doctrine of avulsion? One possibility is that individual
decisions to fix the boundary might be inefficient and dictated by
notions of fairness or perhaps simply politics.127 But it is also possible
that there may be circumstances where a fixed boundary is efficient
even if a migratory boundary generally should be preferred on
efficiency grounds.
Consider the choice in Florida to fix the boundary between private
and public trust property at the preexisting mean high tide line before
undertaking beach renourishment that provided the backdrop for Stop
the Beach Renourishment.128 This choice deprives private landowners of
their immediate adjacency to the ocean because the renourished beach is
interposed between privately owned land and the ocean, on public trust
property seaward of the newly fixed boundary. But fixing the boundary
126. See supra note 43 (referring to indications that rising coastal property values prompt
greater precision in determining coastal boundaries); see also Parker v. New Hanover Cnty., 619
S.E.2d 868, 871, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding an inlet relocation project to protect $600
million of private coastal property).
127. Professor Byrne states that
the avulsion-accretion distinction . . . . seems quite susceptible to judicial
interpretation to reach desired results post-hoc, as the degree of perceptibility
necessary for finding avulsion cannot be stated with any precision. Indeed, it
may be the best rationale for the distinction that its vagaries allow courts to
accomplish substantial justice post-hoc.
Byrne, supra note 11, at 95. Case law supports the idea that avulsion provides the courts with a
means of—as Professor Byrne puts it—“reach[ing] desired results post-hoc.” See Bonelli Cattle
Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 327 (1973) (“The rationale for the doctrine of avulsion is a need
to mitigate the hardship that a shift in title caused by a sudden movement of the river would
cause the abutting landowners were the accretion principle to be applied.”), overruled on other
grounds by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977);
id. at 328 (reaching a possibly post-hoc decision by balancing “the interests of the State and [the
private landowner]” and finding that “[t]he State’s acquisition of the exposed land here could
only be a windfall”).
128. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).
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at the preexisting mean high tide line when undertaking beach
renourishment may be efficient.129 First, the information problems that
in general might make it hard for the courts and private and public
landowners to fix the boundary at a historical line are unlikely to plague
the fixing of the boundary in the context of beach renourishment. In this
context the boundary is determined and fixed before the shape of the
shore is physically altered by renourishment. Thus there is no need to go
back to old photos, maps, or surveys to recreate the shore and define the
point at which the horizontal plane of the mean high water line
hypothetically would have intersected with land along the shore,
because the shore is available for a survey before renourishment.130
Second, fixing the boundary in the context of beach renourishment
may protect the value of private and public trust property. Declines in
private property values due to the loss of ocean adjacency may be offset
by the protection that renourishment provides against declining property
values due to erosion.131 The Florida statute also provides private
landowners with protections to safeguard many of their traditional
littoral rights that should help to reduce any diminution in their property
values.132 Freezing the boundary benefits the public by providing it with
access to the renourished beach, and as discussed above, public access
to the beach has economic value. This public access might be regarded
as a reward for investing in beach renourishment, an expensive

129. See Christie, supra note 2, at 37 (describing beach renourishment of “critically
eroding beaches or beaches that are retreating dramatically” as “one situation . . . where a fixed
boundary is the most reasonable policy resolution and, if legislation is designed properly, should
avoid constitutional problems”).
130. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2599 n.2 (2010) (assuming that “the [surveyed] erosion-control line is the pre-existing mean
high-water line”); Christie, supra note 2, at 40–41 (indicating that the “erosion control line,”
that becomes the fixed boundary, is established “[b]efore construction of a beach restoration
project” and that the mean high water line “is the primary reference for . . . establish[ing] the
erosion control line”).
131. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu refers to the benefits of renourishment for private
upland owners. 4 A.3d 542, 545 (N.J. 2010) In this case a coastal landowner argued that the
court should treat 225 feet of dry sand added to the beach in front of her property as accretion in
its determination of just compensation in an eminent domain action. Id. 545. The court, holding
that the replenishment constituted avulsion, noted that, by the time the case reached oral
argument, the 225 feet of replenished beach already had eroded, and “[o]ne can only surmise
what would have been the damage to the Lius’ property without the 225-foot buffer.” Id. at 553
n.13; see also Christie, supra note 2, at 71 (“As a general proposition, the increase in value of
property that was previously endangered by erosion and that would be protected and enhanced
by a two-hundred-foot wide beach will offset the value of the right to accretions for property on
a critically eroding beach.”).
132. Christie, supra note 2, at 42; see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 39, 43, 66–67 (arguing
that Florida’s statutory scheme for beach renourishment provides in-kind compensation for the
taking of littoral rights).
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endeavor that may be “cost-effective,” at least in Florida,133 but that
might not occur without guaranteeing public access to the renourished
beach.134
III. MAINTAINING AN AMBULATORY BOUNDARY
If an ambulatory boundary is efficient under current circumstances,
should the boundary continue to migrate in a warming world? Sea levels
will rise due to climate change; in turn, rising sea levels will push the
mean high water line landward. As the line shifts, under the doctrine of
erosion, the public trust will burden formerly upland private property
and the public trust will expand at the expense of private property.135
However, as mentioned above, the private property owners whose lands
will be burdened will not be entitled to compensation.
Recent scholarship raises the possibility that the rules of the game
should change in a warming world, and that perhaps private owners
whose land becomes subject to the public trust should receive
compensation.136 These suggestions, which we have not seen fully
articulated, seem based on the idea that it would be unjust to force
landowners to bear the cost of the loss of territory, as they will no
longer have the chance to enjoy gains in their holdings, because the
likelihood of accretion is much diminished in a warming world where
sea levels are rising.137 Thus the suggestions draw on a justice-based
understanding of the reciprocity rationale for an ambulatory boundary,
which justifies awarding any gains in land to private landowners
because they face the downside risk of losses in land.138 These
suggestions seem to reflect a belief that private landowners no longer
face a “fair lottery”139 in a warming world where the mean high water
133. Christie, supra note 2, at 38.
134. Byrne, supra note 11, at 94–95 (“States are unlikely to fund beach reconstruction
projects if the new beaches are constitutionally required to be privately owned.”).
135. Byrne, supra note 25, at 626 (“Under traditional common law rules governing erosion,
the migration of the mean high tide line will change ownership of locations from private owners
to the public.”); see also Byrne, supra note 11, at 80, 100.
For background on sea level rise and climate change, see, for example, Byrne, supra note
11, at 73–76; Hiatt, supra note 25, at 374–77; and Titus, supra note 8, at 1298–300. See also
COLE, supra note 51, at 24 (“During the last 100 years, sea-level monitoring has indicated a
worldwide trend of continual rise in sea level.”).
136. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 25.
138. See Hiatt, supra note 25, at 384 (referring to the reciprocity rationale for accretion and
erosion and arguing that these doctrines should not apply when boundaries shift due to sea level
rise because “the doctrine [will] . . . consistently work to the detriment of private property
owners”). However, Hiatt argues that “[i]t should not be considered a taking” when the
government acquires control over newly submerged private lands due to sea level rise due to
climate change, pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Id. at 385.
139. This term is borrowed from Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 92, at 492.
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line is expected to shift unidirectionally landward. Similarly, it might be
argued that tideland owners stand to reap an unfair windfall in a
warming world on the basis that the right of tideland owners to gain
property through erosion historically has been justified by the equal
possibility that tideland owners lose property as dry land accretes to the
shore.140
The suggestions that private landowners receive compensation for
the landward movement of the mean high water line raise two questions
in Calabresi and Melamed’s terms.141 The first is whether the
entitlement to the land that becomes seaward of the mean high water
line should shift from the state to private landowners. Under current
law, this shifting land becomes subject to the public trust. But the idea
of compensating private landowners for the inland rolling of the public
trust implicitly presumes that private landowners should continue to
remain entitled to the shifting land. The entitlement would transfer to
the public only after the payment of compensation. The second question
concerns the remedy available to private landowners for the loss of their
private parcels to rising seas. As explained above, under current law if
private landowners lose land to the public trust they are not
compensated for the loss of their rights, which means in effect that the
loss remains where it falls.142 Compensating landowners for the loss
would spread the loss across taxpayers.143
We begin with the first question of whether the entitlement to the
shifting land should shift from the state (on behalf of the public) to
private landowners. We focus on whether the state or private
landowners should be entitled to the land as a general rule. Our
discussion presumes that decision makers have the legal authority to
grant the shifting land to private landowners. However, the public trust
doctrine might prevent lawmakers from allowing private landowners to
acquire title to the shifting land because allowing them to do so might
be regarded as alienating a portion of the land to which the public
should retain access under the doctrine.144
140. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009) emphasizes the
symmetry of the claims of the owners of the uplands and the tidelands. For example, Milner
states that “both the Lummi and the Homeowners must accept that the ambulatory boundary is
‘an inherent and essential attribute of the original property,’ and that both the tidelands and the
uplands are subject to diminishment and expansion based on the forces of the sea.” Id. at 1188
(quoting Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68 (1874)).
141. See supra note 39.
142. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39, at 1091 (referring to “[w]hen a loss is left
where it falls in an auto accident”).
143. As we mention below, loss-spreading already occurs through flood insurance and
disaster relief, which promote risky investments on the coast. See infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
144. Byrne, supra note 11, at 81–82 (discussing the potential that the public trust doctrine
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The assignment of the entitlement can be made on efficiency, justice,
or other grounds.145 We analyze the assignment on efficiency grounds,
consistent with our view that a concern with efficiency underpins the
existing presumption for a migratory coastal boundary. In determining
whether to allocate the shifting land to the public trust or to private
landowners, the legal decision maker should allocate the entitlement to
the actor with the highest use value.146 To achieve “allocative
efficiency,”147 the decision maker does not need to determine precisely
the values that private landowners and the public place on the shifting
lands, but only who between them is likely to place a higher value on
the shifting land.148 The decision maker should not count on the parties
being able to subsequently reallocate the entitlement through
negotiation if the decision maker awards the entitlement to the lower
value user because bargaining between the state and private landowners
is likely to encounter high transaction costs.149
It is an empirical question whether the public, acting through the
state, or private landowners are likely to be the relatively higher value
user of the shifting land. Economically oriented scholarship suggests
that the public is likely the higher value user of the shifting lands under
current circumstances, and we do not foresee any reason why the
calculus might change in an era of sea level rise.150 While the law
might prevent the abrogation of accretion, because abrogation “would prospectively prevent the
public from accessing tidelands or submerged lands”); Hiatt, supra note 25, at 382 (“[T]he
public trust doctrine likely requires a state to take title or assert control on behalf of the public
over submerged private lands.”).
145. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39, at 1093; see Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative
Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 271 (2002).
146. See Brooks, supra note 145, at 270 n.11.
147. Id. at 283 (“[A]llocationally efficient rules direct entitlements to the parties who value
them most.”).
148. Id.
149. If the general rule is that private landowners retain title to the shifting land, but these
landowners prove to have lower value uses, the state, which represents the public, in theory
could buy the land from the private landowners through the exercise of eminent domain. But
there are procedural, economic, and political hurdles to the state’s exercise of eminent domain
that in practice could thwart state efforts to buy out large numbers of private landowners over an
extended period of time. See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1734 (“[T]he
main constraints on the use of the eminent domain power are its cumbersomeness and any
political opposition aroused by the possibility of its exercise in a given situation.” (citing
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 77–81 (1986))). If
the state is awarded the shifting land as a trustee for the public and the public is the lower value
user, then private landowners likely will have difficulty buying the lands back from the state.
There are likely to be large numbers of landowners, and many of them might be tempted to free
ride. The state also may be a difficult negotiating partner, again, because of procedural and
political barriers to decision making.
150. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 11, at 82; Rose, supra note 9, at 723; see also Hiatt, supra
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exhibits a general presumption in favor of private property,151 the lands
that underlie tidal and navigable waters immediately near the shore are
distinctive and, as explained above, are not suitable for many uses made
of uplands because either tides affect these lands or they remain
completely submerged. Public trust lands are most amenable to uses
such as navigation, recreation, fishing, and commerce, and public
ownership enables the public to use the lands for these purposes by
eliminating the potential for private landowners to put up roadblocks.152
It is also public use of the public trust lands for these purposes that
gives the lands their value.153
The second question of whether private landowners should receive
compensation arises if, contrary to what we argue, the entitlement over
the shifting land shifts to private landowners. As already mentioned,
legal decision makers might decide to shift the boundary on justice or
fairness grounds, believing that it is no longer fair to burden private
landowners with the costs of the loss of territory, because they no longer
have the reciprocal prospect of gaining land, due to sea level rise
attributable to climate change.
The question of whether private landowners should receive
compensation is similar to the more general question of when
government should pay compensation for takings.154 Under existing law
there is no governmental taking and compensation is not paid when the
public trust encroaches on private land because of changes in the mean
high water line. But the public trust encroaching on privately owned
lands has a number of structural similarities to a government taking: (1)
the private landowner’s rights are diminished, and (2) the state becomes
the beneficiary of the diminution in private rights because it is the state
that safeguards the property as the trustee for the public.155
note 25, at 382 (“[T]he societal interest in public control of tidal lands and waters will be as
applicable in our climate changed future as it has been since Roman times.”).
151. Rose, supra note 9, at 717.
152. See id. at 757–58 (describing “transportation and commerce” as “[t]he uses of
waterways most subject to monopolization or holdout”); id. at 753, 757, 760 (explaining why
locations for recreation might be susceptible to holdouts, after initially arguing that it is difficult
to justify holding areas in trust for the public for recreation using the “anti-holdout rationale”);
Epstein, supra note 33, at 415–16 (discussing the potential for holdouts if “navigable rivers and
lakes” were privately owned). In Severance v. Patterson, the majority notes that fixing the
boundary using avulsion may “allow[] private property owners to retain ownership of property
that becomes submerged under the ocean.” 370 S.W.3d 705, 722 n.20.
153. Rose, supra note 9, at 770–71.
154. There is an extensive literature about the justifications for requiring compensation for
takings. A classic article is Professor Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967).
155. Thanks to Lewis Kornhauser for his help with framing the situation as similar to a
government taking.
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Several variables must be considered, assuming again that we are
aiming to pay compensation only if it is warranted on efficiency
grounds. The implications of not paying compensation for private
landowners’ investment decisions are one potential justification for
paying compensation.156 Professor Frank Michelman refers to these
implications of not paying compensation as “demoralization costs.”157
Private landowners might respond in two ways to the prospect that
rising sea levels will reduce the scope of their holdings. One possibility
is that they will reduce investments in at-risk coastal property, an action
that could decrease coastal property prices.158 A decline in investments
in at-risk coastal property is economically desirable and not something
to forestall through the payment of compensation. There is little point in
encouraging investments in land that is at risk of sinking or increased
flooding.159
The other possibility is that landowners will invest in protective
measures in an effort to ward off the erosion of their holdings.160 These
might take the form of “hard armoring,” for example building erosioncontrol structures, such as sea walls. There is also the possibility of
“soft armoring,” such as reinforcing dunes and restoring wetlands.161
156. Recall in this light Michelman’s statement that “[t]he correct utilitarian statement,
then, insofar as the issue of compensability is concerned, is that compensation is due whenever
demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise.” Michelman, supra note 154, at
1215.
157. Id. at 1214 (“‘Demoralization costs’ are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value
necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from
the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of
lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by
the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.”
(footnote omitted)).
158. Titus argues for “rolling easements” along the ocean coasts, partly on the basis that
they will discourage property owners from inefficient investments. Titus, supra note 8, at 1325–
26.
159. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s proposal to spend as much as $400 million to buy
out coastal property owners whose homes in flood-prone areas were destroyed by Hurricane Sandy
is indicative of a growing recognition that, in view of expected sea level rise, some coastal
investment should be discouraged. See Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Is Seeking to Curb Building in
TIMES,
Feb.
4,
2013,
at
A1,
available
at
Flooded
Area,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/nyregion/cuomo-seeking-home-buyouts-in-flood-zones.html.
160. Michelman refers to the potential that a landowner might avoid a governmental taking
by “devoting a large proportion of his energies and resources to counter-strategy aimed at
fending off the risk” of a government taking. Michelman, supra note 154, at 1217. On the
likelihood that private owners will resist the incursion of the public trust, see, for example,
Byrne, supra note 25, at 626; Byrne, supra note 11, at 81.
161. Byrne, supra note 11, at 87 (defining hard and soft armoring); see also Mireya Navarro &
Rachel Nuwer, Resisted for Blocking the View, Dunes Prove They Blunt Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
4, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/science/earth/after-hurricanesandy-dunes-prove-they-blunt-storms.html (discussing the protection that dunes offered
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The idea that landowners might engage in “armoring” is not idle
speculation. When permitted by state law, coastal landowners do
already invest in erosion control structures to preserve their parcels
against natural changes.162
Landowner investments in armoring are a form of self-help. As
Professor Smith argues, “[S]elf-help measures . . . . are inefficient if
they are less cost-effective than government-supplied protection.”163
The relative cost-effectiveness of landowners’ and governmental
protective measures is an empirical question. However, there is a
reasonable basis for thinking that private self-help is likely to be less
cost-effective than government-provided protection, especially if the
external costs of private armoring are counted. It is well recognized that
individual landowners’ hard armoring imposes costs on others, because
the construction of a sea wall in one area may exacerbate erosion
elsewhere, negatively affecting other private landowners, as well as
public access to the shore.164 Governmental authorities might stand a
better chance of devising mechanisms to control erosion that reflect
broader social costs and benefits.165 Thus one argument in favor of
compensation is that the absence of compensation encourages private
self-help by landowners. However, it may be possible to limit
landowner self-help by the regulation of erosion control structures and
regulation may be a more cost-effective way of avoiding undesirable
self-help than compensation. “A number of” coastal states already
regulate the construction of erosion control structures, and there is case
law holding that such regulation is not an unconstitutional taking such
as to require compensation.166 In the end neither the possibility that
landowners will invest in self-help nor the possibility that landowners
communities from the effects of Hurricane Sandy).
162. Byrne, supra note 11, at 101 (noting that “[a] number of states already prohibit
armoring on the oceanfront, and so far these have survived takings challenges” but warning
that the plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment might provide a basis for
challenging prohibitions in some states); Titus, supra note 8, at 1281–82 (discussing the
construction of sea walls along the coasts, especially along bays); Michael Schwirtz,
Dispute in Hamptons Set Off by Effort to Hold Back Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/nyregion/southampton-homeownersbuild-barricades-to-hold-back-sea.html (reporting that Hamptons homeowners are building
“barricades” in light of Hurricane Sandy).
163. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1785.
164. Byrne, supra note 11, at 87 (“Hard armoring . . . often increases erosion of
neighboring properties by increasing current and wave action laterally against unprotected
shorelines.”); see also Christie, supra note 2, at 37–38; Sax, supra note 24, at 642–43.
165. See Byrne, supra note 11, at 87; Epstein, supra note 11, at 41.
166. Byrne, supra note 11, at 101; see also Titus, supra note 8, at 1299, 1301, 1375, 1376
(discussing state measures). However, Professor Byrne suggests that recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence might jeopardize the ability of states to “prohibit[] armoring without
compensation to owners.” Byrne, supra note 11, at 102.
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will curtail their investments in coastal property seems sufficiently
problematic to justify the payment of compensation.
Thus far we have concluded that compensation is not justified based
on how landowners are likely to respond if they do not receive
compensation. There are also other factors that weigh against
compensation. A traditional factor is the associated administrative costs,
which fall under Michelman’s rubric of “settlement costs.”167
Compensating private landowners would require establishing a process
for determining the amount to pay for the loss of lands attributable to
sea level rise due to global warming. The causation issues are
formidable if we want to construct a program that pays compensation
only for land losses due to climate change. This is because it would be
necessary to link losses in particular areas to climate change with a
degree of certainty that is likely to be very difficult to attain.
Another factor that weighs against compensation is the potential that
compensation would exacerbate an existing moral hazard problem.168
There already are subsidies for investing in coastal property, including
subsidized flood insurance and disaster assistance, that likely encourage
overinvestment in light of the risks.169 Paying compensation might
further encourage investments that are socially undesirable given the
risks of rising seas and greater numbers of increasingly severe weather
events due to climate change.170
In suggesting that governments should not compensate landowners
167. Michelman, supra note 154, at 1214 (“‘Settlement costs’ are measured by the dollar
value of the time, effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation
settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs.”).
168. There is a general argument that the “payment of full compensation to aggrieved
property owners [for governmental takings of their property] can distort the owners’ primary
behavior by creating moral hazard problems, thereby inducing them to overinvest in assets.”
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property
Rights, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1927, 1931 (2012). Professors Bell and Parchomovsky helpfully cite
the literature analyzing the possibility that takings compensation could prompt moral hazard
issues, including the important article by Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When
Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). Id. at 1931 nn.13–15, 1951–52.
169. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40650, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, CHALLENGES, AND FINANCIAL STATUS 8 (2012) (“The availability of
federally-subsidized flood insurance in high-risk areas arguably encouraged too many people to
locate in flood-prone areas and to not take appropriate steps to mitigate loss, leaving these
financial losses to be either uncompensated or transferred to third-parties, including taxpayers
via federal disaster assistance. Economists maintain that the assurance of federal assistance in
the event of a repeated disaster creates a ‘moral hazard’ by lowering the incentives to avoid
risk.”); see also Byrne, supra note 11, at 83–85 (urging reform of flood insurance); Tarlock,
supra note 74, at 757 (“[A] federal flood-insurance program encourages over-building in high
risk areas.”).
170. For a related argument, see Tarlock, supra note 74, at 756–57, where Professor
Tarlock argues that climate change suggests that the risk of moral hazard should factor into
takings analyses.
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for losses caused by erosion due to climate change because it would not
be efficient to do so, we do not intend to suggest that public policy
should always be based on efficiency considerations. Yet efficiency
should play a major role in deciding whether to compensate private
property owners along the coast because efficiency is an important, if
often unarticulated, underpinning of boundary determination along the
coasts. Moreover, the force of the justice- or fairness-based concerns
about landowners losing property without compensation would seem to
be muted by the likelihood that their losses will be gradual. Provided
change proceeds slowly, landowners should be able to gradually adjust
their expectations to accord with the new realities along the coasts.171
CONCLUSION
Land borders usually are assumed to be fixed and stable. This Article
has highlighted an important border that is generally unstable due to
both natural forces and to a legal preference for an ambulatory
boundary: the border between private and public trust property on ocean
beaches. This Article has argued that this migratory boundary is
efficient as a general rule in current circumstances, and that the
boundary should be allowed to migrate as usual in an era of climate
change. The ambulatory boundary protects the water adjacency of
private landowners and the public, while promoting administrative
efficiency. In individual circumstances where an ambulatory boundary
is problematic, the boundary potentially can be fixed under the doctrine
of avulsion, assuming that it applies along the coast in the relevant
jurisdiction and that the changes along the shore are “sudden and
perceptible.”172 However in general an ambulatory boundary remains an
efficient way of recognizing the distinct combination of private and
public interests on the beach.173 The modern preference for a migrating
boundary reflects a wise balancing of interests that should be preserved
going forward as the coastline changes along with the climate.

171. See id.; Hiatt, supra note 25, at 393–94.
172. FLUSHMAN, supra note 8, at 94. As mentioned earlier, there may be legal obstacles to
generically fixing the boundary. Supra note 61.
173. See, e.g., Sax, supra 11, at 356 (“The reality is that there exists on the seashore a zone
that is neither wholly public nor wholly private, but in which some accommodation must be
made between public and private entitlements.”); see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 45
(observing that “[t]he boundaries of beachfront property . . . raise profound issues that do not
arise with respect to most plots of land”).
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